Monday, November 16, 2026

Malawi Needs a Monetary Integrity Policy: Protecting the Fundamental Value of Money

 


Why the kwacha must be protected as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and a store of value.

Introduction: What Is the Purpose of Money?

For decades, discussions about Malawi's monetary policy have largely revolved around inflation, interest rates, foreign exchange shortages, and the devaluation of the kwacha. Whenever the country experiences significant external economic pressure, exchange-rate adjustment frequently becomes part of the policy debate.

However, an important question deserves greater attention: Should the value of money itself be allowed to deteriorate repeatedly as a mechanism for adjusting to economic difficulties?

Money is not merely a tool for facilitating transactions. It is an essential institution upon which savings, investment, wages, contracts, and economic planning depend.

Economics recognises three fundamental functions of money:

  1. Medium of exchange: Money facilitates the purchase and sale of goods and services.

  2. Unit of account: Money provides a common measure for prices, wages, debts, assets, and financial obligations.

  3. Store of value: Money enables individuals and institutions to preserve purchasing power over time.

These functions are interconnected. When money loses its reliability as a store of value, its usefulness as a unit of account may weaken. Eventually, confidence in its role as a medium of exchange may also deteriorate.

Malawi should therefore consider adopting a Monetary Integrity Policy, under which protecting these three functions becomes the central obligation of monetary governance.

1. The Problem With Repeated Currency Devaluation

Currency devaluation is often presented as a necessary response to external economic imbalances.

When a country experiences persistent foreign exchange shortages, reducing the official value of its currency may help align the exchange rate with underlying market conditions. It can also improve the price competitiveness of exports under certain circumstances.

However, devaluation has consequences that extend beyond international trade.

When the kwacha is devalued, more kwacha are required to purchase the same quantity of foreign currency. Consequently, the domestic cost of imported fuel, fertilizer, machinery, medicines, and other essential products may increase.

These higher costs can spread throughout the economy, affecting transportation, agricultural production, manufacturing, and household consumption.

Workers whose wages do not increase proportionately experience declining real incomes. Households holding cash savings may find that their accumulated wealth purchases fewer goods and services.

Businesses may also struggle to establish reliable long-term prices and investment projections.

Repeated devaluation can therefore contribute to a cycle of inflation, declining purchasing power, and reduced confidence in the national currency.

Importantly, devaluation is not always the original cause of currency weakness. Persistent trade imbalances, excessive monetary expansion, fiscal instability, low productivity, and insufficient foreign exchange earnings may create the conditions that make devaluation necessary.

Nevertheless, repeated devaluation can reinforce expectations of future depreciation, encouraging households and businesses to prefer foreign currencies.

A country that continually relies on reducing the value of its currency risks weakening public confidence in the currency itself.

2. The Empirical Case Against Repeated Devaluation in Malawi

The argument for adopting a Monetary Integrity Policy is strengthened by decades of empirical research questioning the effectiveness of currency devaluation as a mechanism for correcting Malawi's external trade imbalances.

Mataya and Veeman (1997) examined successive devaluations and found that subsequent improvements in the trade balance were insufficient to compensate for the initial deterioration.

Kwalingana et al. (2012) similarly established that real exchange-rate depreciation did not produce statistically significant long-term improvements in Malawi's trade balance.

Mangani (2011) found that Malawi's foreign trade was largely unresponsive to real effective exchange-rate movements, challenging the assumption that depreciation would substantially stimulate exports or discourage imports.

Further evidence from Mndaka, Silumbu and Mangani (2022) found that the expected trade-balance adjustment mechanisms were not supported for Malawi.

Although some studies identify potential long-term benefits from devaluation, the broader evidence demonstrates that exchange-rate depreciation alone is not a reliable solution to Malawi's structural economic problems.

Malawi's limited export diversification, production constraints, dependence on essential imports, and exposure to international commodity markets restrict the effectiveness of exchange-rate adjustments.

Meanwhile, depreciation increases the domestic cost of imported goods and can reduce household purchasing power.

The central policy concern is that Malawi may repeatedly incur the inflationary and welfare costs of devaluation without securing the sustained trade improvements used to justify it.

This evidence strengthens the case for a Monetary Integrity Policy that prioritises currency stability, productivity improvements, export diversification, and sustainable foreign exchange generation.

Rather than repeatedly adjusting the value of money to accommodate structural economic weaknesses, Malawi should prioritise correcting those weaknesses while protecting the fundamental functions of its currency.

3. Monetary Integrity as a National Economic Principle

A Monetary Integrity Policy would establish that the fundamental functions of money must be protected as core national economic objectives.

The guiding principle would be:

The national currency shall remain a reliable medium of exchange, a consistent unit of account, and a dependable store of value. Monetary and fiscal policies shall be designed to preserve these functions rather than routinely compromise them to accommodate economic imbalances.

This principle would change how monetary policy is evaluated.

Instead of measuring success primarily through exchange-rate movements, interest-rate decisions, or money supply growth, policymakers would be required to demonstrate how their decisions preserve the practical usefulness and purchasing power of the kwacha.

The policy would rest on three pillars.

Pillar One: Protecting the Medium of Exchange

The kwacha must remain an effective and widely accepted means of payment.

Citizens and businesses should be able to conduct ordinary domestic transactions without being compelled by monetary instability to rely on foreign currencies.

This requires reliable payment infrastructure, adequate domestic liquidity, efficient settlement systems, and confidence in the banking sector.

Digital payments, financial inclusion, and modern banking infrastructure can strengthen this function.

However, technological improvements alone cannot compensate for a currency whose value is persistently unstable.

Pillar Two: Protecting the Unit of Account

The kwacha must remain a dependable measure of economic value.

Businesses should be able to price products, prepare budgets, sign contracts, and evaluate investments without continually revising their assumptions because of unpredictable monetary instability.

Similarly, workers and employers should be able to negotiate wages with reasonable expectations about future purchasing power.

A stable unit of account reduces uncertainty and supports long-term economic planning.

When prices change rapidly and unpredictably, the information conveyed by prices becomes less reliable, making economic coordination more difficult.

Pillar Three: Protecting the Store of Value

Perhaps the most important pillar is preserving the purchasing power of money over time.

A worker who saves part of their salary should reasonably expect those savings to retain substantial economic value in the future.

A pensioner should not see years of accumulated savings systematically eroded by persistent high inflation.

Businesses should be able to retain working capital without constantly seeking alternative assets merely to protect its value.

This does not mean that the purchasing power of money can remain perfectly constant under every circumstance. Economic shocks, changing relative prices, and global market conditions make absolute stability impossible.

However, monetary policy can and should establish a credible commitment to preventing persistent and excessive erosion of purchasing power.

Citizens should not be expected to continually defend their savings against the consequences of monetary instability.

4. Monetary Integrity Should Take Priority Over Exchange-Rate Flexibility

Exchange-rate flexibility is often defended because it allows economies to adjust to external shocks.

However, flexibility should be regarded as a policy instrument rather than an economic objective in itself.

If exchange-rate adjustments repeatedly undermine purchasing power, their broader economic costs deserve careful examination.

A Monetary Integrity Policy would require policymakers to consider alternative adjustment mechanisms before relying on currency depreciation.

For example, persistent foreign exchange shortages should trigger coordinated measures to improve export earnings, strengthen domestic production, attract productive investment, and manage external financial obligations.

Similarly, weak export competitiveness should encourage investment in productivity, infrastructure, energy reliability, technology, and efficient production systems.

Devaluation should not become a substitute for addressing these structural weaknesses.

This does not imply that the exchange rate must remain permanently fixed at an arbitrary level.

An exchange rate that cannot be sustained by available foreign exchange reserves and economic fundamentals may eventually collapse, causing even greater instability.

The objective should therefore be to minimise avoidable currency instability while maintaining a credible and sustainable monetary framework.

5. Considering a Trade-Weighted Currency Basket

One possible supporting instrument would be to manage the kwacha against a basket of currencies representing Malawi's principal international trading and financial relationships.

Rather than relying predominantly on movements against the US dollar, a trade-weighted basket could incorporate currencies such as the South African rand, Chinese yuan, euro, Indian rupee, and US dollar.

The actual composition would need to reflect verified trade flows, transaction invoicing currencies, foreign debt obligations, and other external financial exposures.

Such a basket could reduce the influence of fluctuations in any single foreign currency on Malawi's exchange-rate policy.

However, a basket would not automatically guarantee monetary stability.

A fixed basket peg still requires sufficient foreign exchange reserves, sustainable fiscal policies, and confidence in the central bank's ability to maintain the exchange-rate commitment.

Therefore, the basket should be evaluated as a possible mechanism for supporting monetary integrity, not as a replacement for sound economic fundamentals.

6. Fiscal Discipline Is Essential to Monetary Integrity

Monetary integrity cannot be achieved through central-bank decisions alone.

Government fiscal policy has a direct influence on monetary stability.

Persistent fiscal deficits, unsustainable borrowing, and excessive dependence on monetary financing can undermine confidence in the national currency.

Where government expenditure consistently exceeds sustainable revenue and financing capacity, pressure may emerge to accommodate fiscal imbalances through monetary expansion or other destabilising measures.

A Monetary Integrity Policy should therefore establish clear coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities while protecting the operational independence of the Reserve Bank of Malawi.

Government should be expected to maintain credible medium-term fiscal plans, manage public debt sustainably, and avoid relying on inflationary monetary financing.

Public expenditure should increasingly prioritise investments that expand productive capacity, strengthen exports, and reduce structural economic vulnerabilities.

The fundamental principle is straightforward:

Government financing difficulties should not routinely be resolved by eroding the purchasing power of money held by citizens.

7. Building the Economic Foundations of a Stable Kwacha

A credible currency ultimately depends on the productive and institutional strength of the economy supporting it.

For Malawi, protecting monetary integrity would require sustained improvements in several areas.

Export development: Malawi must increase the diversity, value, and competitiveness of its exports to generate more reliable foreign exchange earnings.

Domestic production: Investment in agriculture, manufacturing, energy, and infrastructure can reduce costly supply constraints and economically inefficient dependence on imports.

Foreign exchange reserves: Adequate reserve buffers are necessary to manage external shocks and support orderly foreign exchange markets.

Financial market development: Reliable kwacha-denominated savings, pension, and investment instruments can strengthen confidence in holding domestic financial assets.

Institutional credibility: Transparent monetary decisions, consistent economic policies, reliable statistics, and accountable public institutions are essential to building long-term confidence.

These measures would help ensure that currency stability is supported by real economic capacity rather than maintained through administrative restrictions alone.

8. Establishing a Monetary Integrity Scorecard

The proposed policy should include measurable indicators through which Parliament, businesses, and citizens can evaluate monetary performance.

Such indicators could include:

FunctionProposed performance indicators
Medium of exchangePayment reliability, transaction costs, currency acceptance, and settlement efficiency
Unit of accountInflation volatility, price predictability, and stability of long-term contracts
Store of valueCumulative inflation, purchasing-power retention over five and ten years, and real returns on savings
External monetary stabilityExchange-rate volatility, reserve adequacy, and foreign exchange market accessibility
Policy credibilityAchievement of published monetary targets and transparent explanations of deviations

The Reserve Bank could publish an annual Monetary Integrity Report explaining how policy decisions have affected each function of money.

Such reporting would make monetary accountability more meaningful to ordinary citizens.

For example, rather than focusing exclusively on whether annual inflation has declined, policymakers would also explain how much purchasing power the kwacha has retained over the preceding five or ten years.

A reduction in inflation from 25% to 15% represents slower price increases, not a restoration of previously lost purchasing power.

This distinction is essential.

9. Implementation Should Be Gradual but Credible

Adopting a Monetary Integrity Policy would not require Malawi to announce an immediate and rigid exchange-rate peg.

Indeed, attempting to impose an unsustainable exchange rate could undermine the policy before it becomes established.

Implementation should proceed through a carefully sequenced programme.

First, establish the policy mandate. Government and the Reserve Bank should formally recognise the three functions of money as central objectives of monetary governance, supported by clear and measurable standards.

Second, restore macroeconomic credibility. Fiscal discipline, inflation control, improved foreign exchange market functioning, and reserve accumulation should take priority.

Third, evaluate alternative monetary anchors. A trade-weighted currency basket, inflation-targeting framework, or appropriately designed hybrid arrangement should be assessed against Malawi's economic conditions.

Fourth, strengthen institutional accountability. Monetary authorities should publish measurable targets, explain deviations, and demonstrate how corrective measures protect purchasing power.

Finally, build long-term monetary confidence. Consistent policy implementation should gradually reduce expectations of persistent depreciation and encourage greater use of kwacha-denominated savings and investments.

The ultimate objective would be a currency whose credibility is earned through sustained economic performance rather than maintained through repeated administrative intervention.

10. Monetary Integrity Is Also a Development Policy

Stable money is not merely a concern for economists, central bankers, or financial institutions.

It has direct implications for national development.

When households trust the long-term value of money, saving becomes more attractive.

When businesses can forecast costs and revenues with greater confidence, long-term investment becomes easier to evaluate.

When financial institutions can offer reliable long-term products, domestic capital formation may improve.

And when workers can reasonably expect their earnings to retain purchasing power, economic planning becomes less uncertain.

Monetary integrity can therefore support investment, productivity, financial development, and economic growth.

It should not be treated as an alternative to development policy, but as one of its essential foundations.

At the same time, currency stability alone cannot create prosperity. Malawi must still address infrastructure limitations, low productivity, trade imbalances, governance weaknesses, and inadequate investment.

A stable currency provides a more predictable environment in which these challenges can be addressed.

Conclusion: Malawi Must Protect the Value of Its Money

Malawi's monetary policy debate should move beyond the recurring question of when and by how much the kwacha should be devalued.

The more fundamental question is whether the country's monetary institutions are adequately protecting the essential functions of money.

A national currency should not merely exist as a means of payment. It should provide a dependable foundation for measuring economic value, accumulating savings, entering contracts, and planning for the future.

Repeated depreciation and persistent inflation can weaken these functions, reduce public confidence, and encourage dependence on foreign currencies.

The empirical evidence questioning the effectiveness of devaluation in Malawi makes the need for an alternative policy framework particularly compelling.

A Monetary Integrity Policy would establish a different national commitment: the kwacha must be managed to remain a reliable medium of exchange, a consistent unit of account, and a dependable store of value.

Achieving this objective would require fiscal discipline, credible monetary institutions, productive investment, export development, and a sustainable exchange-rate framework.

It would also require policymakers to recognise that economic adjustment has consequences for the wealth and welfare of citizens.

The value of money should not be treated as an expendable instrument of economic management. It should be protected as one of the foundations of economic stability and national development.

Malawi should therefore consider adopting a Monetary Integrity Policy—not as a promise that the kwacha will never fluctuate, but as a binding commitment that preserving the fundamental functions of money will remain at the centre of national economic policy.

The goal should not simply be a stronger kwacha tomorrow, but a trustworthy kwacha for generations to come.


References for Further Reading

  • Mangani, R. (2011). The Effects of Real Exchange Rate Misalignment on Trade Balance in Malawi.

  • Mataya, C. S., & Veeman, M. M. (1997). Research on exchange-rate devaluation and Malawi's trade balance.

  • Kwalingana et al. (2012). Research on exchange-rate depreciation and Malawi's trade balance.

  • Mndaka, Silumbu, & Mangani (2022). Research on the J-curve and Marshall–Lerner condition in Malawi.

Tuesday, November 03, 2026

The Tai Chi Approach: How Government Can Respond to Demonstrations Without Confrontation

 

Lessons from the ancient art of Tai Chi for political leadership, public accountability and peaceful conflict resolution in Malawi.

Introduction

The Human Rights Defenders Coalition (HRDC) has called for the resignation of Malawi's Minister of Energy over persistent fuel shortages and electricity outages. The planned demonstrations present a challenge not only to the minister but also to the government's approach to public dissatisfaction.

When citizens take to the streets, governments may be tempted to respond defensively, interpreting demonstrations as attacks on their authority. Yet there is another approach worth considering, one inspired by the ancient Chinese martial art of Tai Chi.

What if, instead of resisting the pressure of demonstrations, government learned to absorb it, redirect it and transform it into an opportunity for constructive engagement?

I call this the Tai Chi Approach to Political Leadership.

1. Understanding the Tai Chi Principle

Tai Chi is a martial art built around balance, controlled movement, sensitivity and the intelligent management of force.

One of its fundamental techniques is Lu, commonly translated as "Roll Back".

Rather than meeting an incoming force with equal and opposite force, the practitioner yields, maintains balance and redirects the force along a different path.

The objective is not necessarily to overpower an opponent but to avoid being destabilised by the opponent's momentum.

This principle offers an interesting lesson for political leadership.

A demonstration represents the collective expression of public frustration. When government responds with hostility, threats or unnecessary force, it risks intensifying the confrontation.

But when government acknowledges the grievances, listens carefully and responds constructively, the same public pressure can become an opportunity for accountability and reform.

The important distinction is that peaceful demonstrators are not enemies to be defeated. They are citizens exercising a constitutional right.

2. Receive the Force: Acknowledge Public Grievances

The first movement in the Tai Chi Approach is to receive the incoming force rather than deny its existence.

In Malawi's current circumstances, fuel shortages and electricity outages have serious consequences for households, businesses, transport operators and the wider economy.

People experience these problems directly. They do not need politicians to convince them that the problems exist.

Therefore, the first response should be an acknowledgment of the difficulties citizens are experiencing.

Government can recognise that the public has legitimate reasons to demand explanations without necessarily agreeing with every demand made by demonstration organisers.

Acknowledging a problem is not an admission that every accusation is correct. It is recognition that the problem deserves attention.

A defensive response may create the impression that government is more concerned about protecting its image than addressing the difficulties citizens face.

In Tai Chi, rigidity makes a practitioner vulnerable. In leadership, an unwillingness to listen can have a similar effect.

3. Yield Without Surrendering: Separate Grievances From Demands

The second principle is to yield without losing balance.

HRDC's demand for the resignation of the Minister of Energy is one proposed response to the fuel and electricity crises.

However, acknowledging the seriousness of those crises does not automatically establish that resignation is the only possible remedy.

The shortages may involve several interconnected factors, including foreign exchange scarcity, fuel procurement arrangements, transportation challenges, electricity generation constraints and infrastructure deficiencies.

Some of these problems may have existed before the current minister assumed office.

Others may involve decisions made during the minister's tenure.

A constructive response would distinguish between these issues and establish where responsibility lies.

Government can therefore recognise the grievances while explaining which decisions fall within the minister's authority, which involve other institutions and what evidence exists of administrative failures.

Yielding does not mean surrendering to every demand. It means being willing to examine the demand without becoming defensive.

Equally, rejecting a demand should not mean rejecting the citizens who make it.

4. Redirect the Energy: From Resignation to Solutions

In Tai Chi, the force received is redirected rather than simply stopped.

In public administration, this suggests turning the energy of demonstrations toward a process that produces measurable outcomes.

Consider the fuel crisis.

If foreign exchange shortages are preventing suppliers from importing sufficient fuel, replacing the Minister of Energy does not automatically produce the foreign currency required.

If transportation arrangements are contributing to delivery delays, the solution may require changes in procurement contracts, logistics or distribution systems.

Similarly, if electricity outages result from inadequate generation capacity, replacing a minister does not immediately construct additional power stations.

These observations do not eliminate political accountability. They show why accountability must extend beyond identifying an individual to examining the systems responsible for delivering public services.

The government could respond by publishing a credible recovery programme that identifies:

  • The principal causes of the fuel and electricity crises.

  • The institutions responsible for addressing each cause.

  • The financial and technical resources required.

  • The actions already undertaken.

  • Measurable targets and realistic implementation timelines.

  • Mechanisms for independent monitoring and public reporting.

Such a programme would allow citizens to evaluate progress rather than rely entirely on political assurances.

The demonstration would then become one means of demanding answers and monitoring whether those answers translate into results.

5. Maintain Balance: Protect the Right to Demonstrate

An important aspect of Tai Chi is maintaining one's centre of balance even when external pressure increases.

For government, this means preserving constitutional order while respecting the rights of citizens.

Section 38 of the Constitution of Malawi recognises the right to assemble and demonstrate peacefully and unarmed.

The exercise of that right involves several actors with different responsibilities.

Demonstration organisers have responsibilities concerning planning, coordination and peaceful conduct.

Participants must refrain from violence, intimidation and destruction of property.

The police have a responsibility to facilitate peaceful assemblies, protect participants and the wider public, and respond lawfully and proportionately to genuine threats.

Government authorities must respect constitutional rights and ensure that security institutions act within the law.

Counter-demonstrators and other members of the public must also respect the rights of those participating peacefully.

These responsibilities are shared, but they are not identical.

The state carries particular obligations because it possesses legal authority and coercive powers.

Consequently, isolated misconduct by some individuals should not automatically be attributed to every participant or used to justify suppressing an otherwise peaceful assembly.

A government's ability to protect demonstrations against itself is an important expression of constitutional maturity.

The objective should not be to prevent citizens from expressing dissatisfaction. It should be to ensure that disagreement occurs peacefully and within the law.

6. Restore Equilibrium: Turn Public Pressure Into Accountability

The final movement of the Tai Chi Approach is the restoration of balance.

In political leadership, balance is not achieved merely because demonstrators have returned home or public criticism has temporarily subsided.

It requires addressing the conditions that generated the dissatisfaction.

If fuel remains unavailable and electricity outages continue, the underlying problem persists regardless of whether demonstrations take place.

A sustainable response therefore requires government to demonstrate progress through actions that citizens can independently assess.

For example, fuel recovery could be measured through actual deliveries, distribution volumes and availability at filling stations.

Electricity-sector recovery could be measured through generation availability, outage frequency, restoration times and progress on infrastructure rehabilitation.

Where government commitments are not fulfilled, officials should explain the reasons and identify corrective measures.

This creates a relationship between public pressure and institutional accountability.

Citizens retain the right to demand change, while government has an opportunity to demonstrate that it is responding to their concerns.

7. The Limits of the Tai Chi Analogy

There is one important qualification.

In martial arts, an incoming force is often associated with an opponent. In a constitutional democracy, citizens exercising their right to demonstrate are not opponents of the state.

Government should therefore not use the Tai Chi Approach as a technique for manipulating demonstrators, weakening their demands or making protests disappear without addressing their causes.

The purpose of the analogy is to encourage restraint, constructive engagement and problem-solving.

There may also be circumstances where resignation, disciplinary action or other consequences are warranted by evidence of misconduct, negligence or serious failures of leadership.

The Tai Chi Approach should not become a means of avoiding those consequences.

Rather, it should create the conditions for determining responsibility fairly, transparently and without unnecessary confrontation.

8. A Lesson for Malawi's Political Leadership

Malawi's fuel and electricity challenges illustrate how economic, administrative and political responsibilities can overlap.

The Minister of Energy may be responsible for sectoral policy and oversight, while foreign exchange availability involves the Ministry of Finance, the Reserve Bank and broader economic conditions.

Electricity supply involves generation, transmission, distribution, financing and infrastructure investment.

The public experiences the combined consequences of these systems, regardless of which institution is responsible for a particular failure.

This creates a leadership challenge.

Citizens demand results, while government must coordinate several institutions to deliver them.

The Tai Chi Approach suggests that public dissatisfaction should be treated as information about failures requiring attention, rather than simply as a political threat requiring resistance.

It also recognises that peaceful demonstrations can play a constructive role in making public institutions more responsive.

Conclusion: Strength Is Not Always Resistance

There is a lesson in Tai Chi that extends beyond martial arts.

When force approaches, resisting it directly is not always the most effective response. Sometimes the wiser response is to receive it, understand its direction, maintain balance and redirect the interaction toward a constructive outcome.

The same principle can inform political leadership.

When citizens demonstrate, government does not necessarily have to choose between confrontation and unconditional acceptance of every demand.

There is another possibility: acknowledge the grievances, protect constitutional rights, examine responsibility, engage openly and implement measurable solutions.

For Malawi, the fundamental question should extend beyond whether the Minister of Energy resigns.

It should also ask whether the country is correcting the institutional and economic failures that contribute to persistent fuel shortages and electricity outages.

A demonstration may end in a day, but the problems that caused it will remain until they are addressed.

The ultimate measure of leadership is therefore not whether government successfully withstands public pressure, but whether it responds to that pressure in ways that improve public services, strengthen accountability and preserve constitutional freedoms.

The Tai Chi Approach: Receive the pressure. Maintain the balance. Redirect toward solutions. Restore public confidence.


An opinion and public policy analysis on peaceful demonstrations, political accountability and leadership in Malawi.

Thursday, October 01, 2026

Regional Trade, PAPSS and Malawi’s Foreign Exchange Constraints

 


Malawi’s recurring shortages of fuel, electricity, fertilizer, medicines and other essential imports are often treated as separate sectoral challenges. In reality, many of these pressures are linked by a common structural constraint: the limited availability of foreign exchange required to finance imports.

This raises an important policy question.

To what extent can Malawi reduce its dependence on hard currency by expanding reciprocal trade with neighbouring and regional economies?

The answer lies not in abandoning international trade, but in restructuring part of it. Malawi could make greater use of regional sourcing, reciprocal trade, local-currency settlement and multilateral payment infrastructure, particularly through the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS).

The underlying principle is straightforward:

Increase regional trade, settle locally where possible, and reserve scarce foreign currency for the net external obligations that genuinely require it.

Regional trade should be viewed from both sides

Malawi’s trade discussions often focus on what the country needs to import. A more balanced regional trade strategy should simultaneously consider what neighbouring countries require from Malawi.

For example, Malawi may require fertilizer, electricity, machinery, industrial inputs and food commodities from Zambia. At the same time, Zambia represents a potential market for Malawian agricultural products, processed foods and manufactured goods.

If Malawi imports goods worth US$100 million from Zambia while exporting goods worth US$70 million to the same market, the underlying bilateral imbalance is US$30 million.

A payment and settlement system that facilitates greater use of local currencies and net settlement can therefore reduce the extent to which gross trade flows create immediate demand for hard currency.

The policy objective should not be to eliminate foreign exchange from regional trade altogether. Rather, it should be to ensure that foreign currency is used primarily where necessary, instead of being required for every individual transaction.

PAPSS provides an existing continental settlement framework

The Pan-African Payment and Settlement System provides Africa with an important mechanism for cross-border payments using local currencies.

The system was developed by Afreximbank in collaboration with the African Continental Free Trade Area framework to facilitate intra-African payments and reduce unnecessary dependence on third-country settlement currencies.

For Malawi, this is significant because the relevant infrastructure does not have to be created from the beginning.

Malawi is already connected to the PAPSS ecosystem, and several nearby economies, including Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, also have participating institutions.

This provides a foundation upon which Malawi can build a more deliberate regional trade and settlement strategy.

The key policy question is therefore no longer whether such an arrangement is technically possible, but whether Malawi is making sufficient strategic use of the infrastructure already available.

Regional sourcing should become part of the foreign-exchange strategy

Malawi should systematically identify essential goods and services that can be sourced within the region before turning to more distant international markets.

This should include goods such as:

  • fertilizer,

  • electricity,

  • transformers,

  • switchgear,

  • pumps,

  • agricultural machinery,

  • industrial chemicals,

  • medicines,

  • cables,

  • steel products,

  • electrical equipment,

  • spare parts,

  • and selected food commodities.

Regional sourcing can reduce transport distances, shorten supply chains, improve repair and maintenance turnaround times, and increase the scope for settlement through African payment systems.

It can also strengthen reciprocal trade by creating markets for Malawian exports.

Zimbabwe is a particularly relevant example

Zimbabwe should not be viewed only as a market for agricultural trade. It also possesses an established industrial base in the electricity sector.

Zimbabwean firms manufacture and refurbish a range of electricity infrastructure components, including:

  • distribution transformers,

  • power transformers,

  • switchgear,

  • protection and control panels,

  • substation equipment,

  • electrical motors,

  • concrete poles,

  • line hardware,

  • and other transmission and distribution equipment.

This capability is directly relevant to Malawi.

When ESCOM or EGENCO requires replacement transformers, switchgear, substation equipment or related components, regional suppliers should be assessed before procurement is automatically directed toward Europe, Asia or other distant markets.

Where the required technical standards, voltage specifications, protection requirements and equipment ratings can be met, procurement from Zimbabwe could offer several advantages.

These may include shorter delivery times, easier technical engagement, lower logistics costs, improved access to refurbishment services and greater opportunities for regional settlement.

A more strategic trade relationship could therefore involve Zimbabwe supplying electricity-sector equipment and services while Malawi expands exports of agricultural products, processed foods, manufactured goods and other tradable products into the Zimbabwean market.

PAPSS could facilitate settlement between participating financial institutions and reduce unnecessary dependence on external currencies.

Mozambique remains strategically important

Mozambique is of particular importance because it provides Malawi with access to the sea through the Nacala and Beira corridors.

Malawi relies on Mozambique for or through:

  • port services,

  • fuel transit,

  • transport infrastructure,

  • electricity,

  • logistics,

  • fertilizer,

  • and other imported goods.

At the same time, Mozambique represents a potential market for Malawian agricultural products, processed goods, manufactured products and services.

The relationship should therefore be viewed as a two-way economic corridor rather than simply as a route through which Malawi pays for imports and transit services.

A stronger regional trade arrangement would seek to increase Malawian exports into Mozambique while making greater use of regional payment and settlement systems.

Tanzania also offers significant potential

Tanzania is another important trade and transport partner.

Malawi imports or transports petroleum products, fertilizer, machinery, cement and other commodities through Tanzania.

At the same time, Tanzania represents a large regional market for agricultural commodities, processed foods and manufactured products from Malawi.

The expansion of reciprocal trade with Tanzania could therefore support both supply security and foreign-exchange management.

PAPSS should complement, not replace, production and exports

PAPSS is an important payment mechanism, but it is not a substitute for production.

A country that imports significantly more than it exports will continue to face external payment pressures regardless of the settlement system it uses.

Malawi must therefore continue to expand the volume and value of what it produces.

This means increasing agricultural productivity while also accelerating value addition.

The country should increasingly move from:

raw commodity production

towards:

processing, manufacturing and regional value chains.

For example, instead of exporting only groundnuts, Malawi should expand production of processed foods and consumer products derived from groundnuts.

Instead of exporting only soybeans, Malawi should expand into cooking oil, animal feed and other value-added products.

The objective should be to create stronger, more diversified regional export capacity.

Domestic requirements should remain the first priority

Regional trade should also be structured carefully.

Malawi should avoid exporting commodities that are already in short supply domestically simply to earn foreign exchange.

Where possible, the country should first meet domestic requirements, increase production beyond domestic demand, and then export the surplus.

This helps prevent situations in which the country exports a commodity and later has to re-import it at a higher cost.

A sustainable regional trade policy should therefore be based on production expansion and exportable surplus, not domestic scarcity.

Malawi should develop a regional sourcing and export map

A practical policy measure would be to establish a national regional sourcing and export map.

This would identify:

  1. critical goods and services Malawi imports;

  2. African countries capable of supplying those goods;

  3. products and services Malawi can export to those same markets;

  4. participating banks and payment channels available through PAPSS;

  5. technical and regulatory requirements for regional procurement;

  6. logistics corridors and transport costs;

  7. non-tariff barriers restricting reciprocal trade;

  8. opportunities for local manufacturing and joint ventures.

Such a framework would allow government, utilities, commercial banks and private businesses to make more deliberate procurement and trade decisions.

Before scarce foreign currency is committed to a distant supplier, policymakers and major importers should ask:

Can the required product or service be sourced competitively within SADC, COMESA or the wider AfCFTA market?

If the answer is yes, regional procurement and regional settlement should be given serious consideration.

The objective is to reduce unnecessary gross demand for foreign currency

The core issue is not simply how much Malawi imports.

It is also how those imports are financed.

If Malawi imports US$1 billion worth of goods from African countries and exports US$700 million to African markets, the gross flows are large, but the underlying net imbalance is significantly smaller.

Greater use of local-currency settlement and netting mechanisms can allow more of those opposing trade flows to offset one another.

Foreign currency can then be preserved for areas where it is genuinely necessary, including imports from outside the region and external financial obligations.

This is especially important for an economy facing persistent foreign-exchange shortages.

A broader regional economic strategy

Malawi’s response to foreign-exchange constraints should therefore go beyond seeking additional dollars.

The country should also examine how much of its trade can be reorganised around regional production and settlement.

The strategy should combine:

greater domestic production → regional sourcing → regional exports → local-currency settlement → PAPSS utilisation → value addition → and settlement of only the remaining external imbalance.

This would not eliminate Malawi’s foreign-exchange challenges.

However, it could improve the efficiency with which scarce foreign currency is used, strengthen regional supply chains, reduce vulnerability to distant suppliers, and support the development of African markets for Malawian products.

Conclusion

Malawi’s foreign-exchange challenges require both short-term interventions and long-term structural reforms.

One important element of that response should be greater use of African markets and African payment infrastructure.

The country should deliberately identify what neighbouring economies can supply, determine what those markets require from Malawi, expand production accordingly, and use regional payment mechanisms such as PAPSS wherever appropriate.

Zimbabwe’s capacity to manufacture and refurbish transformers and other electricity-sector equipment illustrates the wider opportunity.

The same approach can be applied to fertilizer, machinery, medicines, industrial inputs, food products and other critical imports.

The policy direction can be summarised as follows:

Produce more locally. Source strategically within the region. Expand reciprocal trade. Use African payment infrastructure. Preserve scarce foreign currency for obligations that genuinely require it.

For Malawi, regional trade should therefore be viewed not only as an export opportunity, but also as an instrument of economic resilience, supply security and foreign-exchange management.

Friday, September 18, 2026

Citizen Participation in Financing Public-Private Partnership Infrastructure Projects in Malawi

1. Background

Malawi continues to face substantial infrastructure requirements in areas such as energy, transport, water, housing, agriculture, telecommunications and public facilities. At the same time, the Government's fiscal capacity to finance all required infrastructure directly is constrained.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) provide an alternative mechanism through which government can work with private investors to develop and operate infrastructure and public services. Under such arrangements, financing may be provided by commercial banks, pension funds, development finance institutions, institutional investors and private project sponsors.

While these sources of capital remain important, there is an opportunity to expand the financing base by creating mechanisms through which ordinary Malawians can also invest in viable PPP projects.

Malawian households collectively hold significant financial resources through bank deposits, mobile money balances, savings groups, pension contributions, investment funds and other forms of savings. Individually, these amounts may appear small. When aggregated, however, they could provide a meaningful source of domestic capital for infrastructure development.

The central proposition of this concept is therefore simple:

Ordinary Malawians should be given an opportunity to participate as investors in commercially viable infrastructure projects implemented through PPP arrangements.

Rather than citizens participating only as taxpayers and users of infrastructure, appropriately designed investment mechanisms could allow them to become financial participants in national development.


2. Problem Statement

Infrastructure development requires large amounts of long-term capital. Government resources alone may not be sufficient to finance the level of investment required, while excessive dependence on external borrowing and foreign-currency financing can create additional fiscal and foreign-exchange risks.

At the same time, infrastructure investment opportunities are generally inaccessible to ordinary citizens.

Participation may be constrained by:

  • high minimum investment requirements;

  • limited knowledge of capital-market instruments;

  • complicated investment procedures;

  • limited access to brokers and investment institutions;

  • long investment periods;

  • lack of liquidity;

  • uncertainty regarding project performance;

  • inadequate visibility of how invested funds are being used; and

  • concerns about governance and protection of investors.

Consequently, there is a gap between citizens who may have relatively small amounts available for saving and infrastructure projects requiring large pools of long-term capital.

The challenge is therefore to develop a mechanism capable of aggregating many small investments into significant infrastructure financing while protecting individual investors.


3. Proposed Concept

The proposal is to establish a framework for Citizen Participation in PPP Infrastructure Financing.

Under the framework, ordinary Malawians would be able to invest affordable amounts into regulated financial instruments whose proceeds are used to finance approved PPP infrastructure projects.

Possible investment instruments could include:

  1. retail infrastructure bonds;

  2. an infrastructure investment fund;

  3. project-specific bonds;

  4. infrastructure equity instruments;

  5. cooperative or community investment schemes;

  6. diaspora infrastructure investment instruments; and

  7. regulated digital investment platforms.

The investments would not constitute donations to government.

Citizens would be purchasing regulated financial assets with clearly defined terms regarding expected returns, maturity, risks and repayment.


4. Proposed Malawi Infrastructure Investment Fund

One possible flagship mechanism would be the establishment of a Malawi Infrastructure Investment Fund (MIIF).

The fund would pool investments from citizens and invest them in a diversified portfolio of qualifying infrastructure and PPP projects.

Instead of requiring an individual to invest directly in a K100 billion road, power plant or water project, thousands or millions of investors could acquire units in the fund.

For example:

Citizen → K5,000 investment → Infrastructure Fund → Portfolio of PPP projects

A citizen investing K5,000 would therefore own an investment in the fund rather than directly financing an entire project.

The fund could subsequently combine citizen capital with financing from:

Citizen savings + Pension funds + Banks + Development finance institutions + PPP sponsors + Institutional investors

This would enable relatively small domestic investments to participate in significantly larger infrastructure projects.


5. Accessibility to Ordinary Malawians

Accessibility should be a central design principle.

The investment mechanism could allow minimum investments starting from amounts such as K1,000 or K5,000, subject to commercial and regulatory assessment.

Citizens could invest through:

  • mobile money;

  • commercial banks;

  • banking applications;

  • licensed investment platforms;

  • stockbrokers;

  • savings and credit cooperatives;

  • regulated investment-management companies; and

  • other authorised financial institutions.

Investors should also be able to make recurring contributions.

For example:

K2,000 every week

or

K10,000 every month

could automatically be transferred from a mobile wallet or bank account into an infrastructure investment account.

This would transform infrastructure investment from an activity predominantly associated with wealthy or institutional investors into another form of long-term household saving.


6. Project-Specific Investment

In addition to a diversified fund, citizens could be given opportunities to invest in specific projects.

Examples might include:

  • a solar power project;

  • a toll road;

  • a water-supply project;

  • student accommodation;

  • an irrigation scheme;

  • an agricultural storage facility;

  • a transport terminal; or

  • other revenue-generating infrastructure.

An investor could therefore choose between investing broadly through an infrastructure fund or investing directly in a project whose risks and expected returns they understand.

For example:

Lilongwe–Salima Road Infrastructure Bond

Investment: K50,000
Interest: defined in the bond terms
Payment: semi-annual
Maturity: defined period
Use of proceeds: specified road project

Such transparency could help establish a direct connection between citizens' savings and visible infrastructure development.


7. Blended Financing Model

Citizen investment would not be expected to finance major projects by itself.

Instead, it would form one component of blended infrastructure financing.

A hypothetical K200 billion project could, for example, be financed as follows:

SourceAmount
Citizen Infrastructure FundK20 billion
Pension fundsK50 billion
Commercial banksK40 billion
Development finance institutionsK50 billion
Private project sponsorK40 billion
TotalK200 billion

The precise financing structure would differ between projects.

The important principle is that citizen investment would provide an additional pool of domestic capital rather than replace established financing sources.


8. Potential Benefits

The model could provide a number of economic and financial benefits.

Mobilisation of Domestic Savings

Small amounts held by large numbers of citizens could collectively create a substantial source of long-term capital.

For illustration, if:

1 million Malawians invested an average of K50,000

the resulting pool would amount to:

K50 billion.

Even considerably smaller average contributions could generate meaningful capital when participation is broad.

Reduced Dependence on External Financing

Greater mobilisation of domestic savings could complement foreign investment and external borrowing and increase the role of local-currency financing.

Financial Returns for Citizens

Citizens would have opportunities to earn investment income from infrastructure rather than participating solely through taxation.

Development of Malawi's Capital Markets

Retail participation in bonds and investment funds could broaden Malawi's investor base and increase public familiarity with securities and long-term investment.

Public Participation in Development

Citizens could become financial stakeholders in infrastructure development.

Financial Inclusion

Mobile and low-value investment mechanisms could introduce segments of the population to regulated savings and investment products.

Long-Term Savings Culture

Infrastructure investments could provide another mechanism through which households accumulate long-term financial assets.


9. Governance and Institutional Framework

Strong governance would be essential.

Relevant institutions could include:

Public Private Partnership Commission

The PPPC could help identify and evaluate suitable PPP projects and ensure projects satisfy the requirements of the PPP framework.

Ministry Responsible for Finance

The Ministry could provide overall fiscal and policy oversight and ensure that government commitments and contingent liabilities remain sustainable.

Reserve Bank of Malawi

The relevant financial-market regulators would oversee authorised financial institutions, investment products and investor-protection requirements within their respective mandates.

Malawi Stock Exchange

The MSE could provide a platform for listing and trading qualifying infrastructure securities, helping investors enter and exit investments.

Fund Managers and Trustees

Professional and independently regulated investment managers could manage pooled investments on behalf of citizens.

Project Companies

Individual PPP projects could operate through special-purpose companies with clearly defined financial structures, obligations and reporting requirements.


10. Investor Protection

Protection of small investors would be critical.

No infrastructure investment should be presented to citizens simply because the project is considered nationally important.

Projects would first need to demonstrate appropriate levels of:

  • technical feasibility;

  • economic justification;

  • financial viability;

  • governance;

  • risk allocation;

  • revenue sustainability;

  • procurement integrity; and

  • regulatory compliance.

Investors should receive simple but comprehensive information showing:

How much am I investing?

Where is the money going?

What return could I receive?

When will I receive it?

What risks am I taking?

Can I withdraw or sell my investment?

What happens if the project performs badly?

Government guarantees, where applicable, should also be clearly disclosed rather than creating an impression that every investment is automatically risk-free.


11. Transparency and Digital Monitoring

Technology could significantly strengthen public confidence.

A citizen investment platform could allow investors to see:

Total investment: K84,000

Energy projects: K30,000

Road projects: K24,000

Water projects: K20,000

Other infrastructure: K10,000

Returns earned: K11,450

Investors could also see project information including:

  • amount raised;

  • amount invested;

  • percentage of project completed;

  • construction milestones;

  • expected completion date;

  • revenue generated;

  • interest paid;

  • principal outstanding; and

  • material risks or delays.

Public project dashboards could further strengthen accountability.


12. Liquidity

One of the major barriers to ordinary citizens investing in infrastructure is the long-term nature of infrastructure projects.

A person may be unwilling to invest savings for ten years if the money cannot be accessed during an emergency.

Where feasible, infrastructure securities should therefore be tradable through secondary markets.

A citizen who initially invests K100,000 in an infrastructure bond could potentially sell the bond to another investor before maturity rather than waiting for the original investment period to end.

A diversified infrastructure fund could similarly offer redemption arrangements subject to appropriate liquidity-management rules.


13. Diaspora Participation

The framework could also provide investment opportunities for Malawians living abroad.

Diaspora investment products could allow Malawians outside the country to participate in identifiable national development projects while potentially contributing foreign currency to infrastructure financing.

Such instruments would require careful management of currency, transfer and repayment risks.


14. Pilot Implementation

Rather than immediately establishing a very large national programme, the approach could initially be tested through a pilot.

A suitable pilot could involve one or a small number of projects that:

  • have clearly identifiable revenue streams;

  • have completed feasibility studies;

  • have manageable risks;

  • have strong governance structures;

  • can demonstrate visible development benefits; and

  • are sufficiently understandable to retail investors.

A limited infrastructure investment fund or retail bond could then be launched around these projects.

The pilot would provide evidence on:

  • citizen demand;

  • preferred investment amounts;

  • effectiveness of mobile distribution;

  • investor behaviour;

  • administrative costs;

  • liquidity requirements;

  • financial literacy needs; and

  • public confidence.

Lessons from the pilot could inform development of a broader national framework.


15. Key Risks

The concept also presents risks that would require careful management.

Project Failure

Infrastructure projects may experience delays, cost overruns or lower-than-expected revenue.

Inflation

Long-term investments may lose real purchasing power if returns do not adequately reflect inflation.

Liquidity Risk

Investors may struggle to sell investments before maturity if secondary markets are insufficiently developed.

Governance Risk

Weak governance or misuse of funds could quickly undermine public confidence.

Political and Policy Risk

Long-term projects may span different administrations and regulatory environments.

Financial Literacy

Some investors may not fully understand the distinction between savings, investments and guaranteed deposits.

Concentration Risk

Citizens could suffer disproportionate losses if investments are concentrated in individual projects.

These risks strengthen the case for professional fund management, diversification, regulation and clear disclosure.


16. Proposed Next Steps

The concept could be developed through a structured feasibility process involving government, PPPC, financial-sector regulators, the Malawi Stock Exchange, banks, pension funds, fund managers, mobile-money operators and potential citizen investors.

Initial work could include:

  1. assessing the legal and regulatory framework for retail infrastructure investment;

  2. estimating the amount of household savings that could realistically be mobilised;

  3. identifying suitable PPP projects for a pilot;

  4. evaluating potential investment instruments;

  5. designing investor-protection requirements;

  6. assessing mobile-money and digital distribution mechanisms;

  7. establishing appropriate governance arrangements;

  8. designing a public transparency platform;

  9. conducting consultations with potential investors; and

  10. implementing a controlled pilot before scaling nationally.


17. Conclusion

Malawi's infrastructure financing challenge cannot realistically be addressed by government resources alone. Commercial banks, institutional investors, development partners and PPP sponsors will continue to play critical roles.

However, ordinary Malawians represent another potential source of domestic capital.

The amounts available to individual citizens may be relatively small, but a properly regulated mechanism capable of pooling investments from hundreds of thousands or millions of people could mobilise significant resources.

The proposal is therefore not that citizens should replace government, banks or major private investors.

Rather, the proposal is to democratise access to infrastructure investment.

A citizen contributing K5,000 should, in principle, be able to participate in the same national development process in which an institutional investor contributes billions.

With appropriate project selection, regulation, investor protection, transparency and digital accessibility, citizen participation in PPP financing could simultaneously support infrastructure development, deepen Malawi's capital markets, encourage long-term saving and allow Malawians to acquire a direct financial stake in the country's development.

The underlying idea can be summarised as follows:

Small investments from many Malawians, combined with institutional and private capital, can become large investments in Malawi's future.

Sunday, April 26, 2026

From Criminalising Begging to Organised Compassion: A City Social Protection Fund for Malawi

Recent debates around Malawi’s anti-begging law have raised an important question: Should poverty be managed through punishment, or through protection?

While concerns about public order, exploitation, and safety are legitimate, many of us may agree that begging is often not a crime of intent, but a symptom of vulnerability — hunger, disability, homelessness, illness, abandonment, or lack of opportunity.

That is why perhaps it is time to think beyond the courtroom and consider a more humane, practical alternative:

A City Vulnerable Persons Support Fund

Rather than responding to begging primarily through criminal law, Malawi’s cities could establish social protection funds to support those genuinely unable to sustain themselves, while helping others transition out of street dependence.

This would not simply be charity.

It would be organised compassion with accountability.

The Core Idea

Each city — whether Lilongwe, Blantyre, Mzuzu or Zomba — could establish a Vulnerable Persons Support Fund, supported through partnerships among:

  • City councils

  • Faith communities

  • Businesses through corporate social responsibility

  • Individual well-wishers

  • Diaspora contributions

  • NGOs and development partners

Imagine a transparent public fund where citizens can contribute through mobile money, institutions can sponsor support programs, and assistance reaches vulnerable people through a structured system rather than informal street giving alone.

Who Would It Support?

Priority support could go to:

  • Elderly persons without family support

  • Persons living with disabilities

  • Chronically ill and labour-constrained individuals

  • Homeless vulnerable adults

  • Street-connected children through protection and reintegration

  • People facing temporary destitution due to crisis

This recognizes a simple truth:

Some people are not refusing to work — they simply cannot cope without support.

Beyond Handouts: Pathways to Dignity

Support should go beyond occasional alms.

The fund could provide:

  • Emergency food assistance

  • Shelter support

  • Small cash transfers in verified cases

  • Medical and social welfare referrals

  • Skills and livelihood support

  • Reintegration assistance for those able to rebuild independence

The goal should not be dependency.

The goal should be dignity.

A Better Role for Well-Wishers

Many citizens want to help, but informal giving at intersections or streets often reaches people unevenly and can sometimes sustain exploitative systems.

What if generosity was organised?

Instead of random giving, well-wishers could contribute into a trusted city mechanism that:

  • Pools support

  • Reaches more people

  • Targets genuine need

  • Reduces abuse

  • Builds long-term solutions

That could turn private compassion into public impact.

Transparency Must Be Central

For such a fund to work, trust is everything. It should be governed by a board including:

  • City authorities

  • Social welfare officials

  • Faith representatives

  • Civil society

  • Disability advocates

  • Private sector partners

  • Independent auditors

And it should publish regular public reports on:

  • Funds received

  • Funds used

  • Beneficiaries supported

  • Administrative costs

  • Independent audits

If citizens can see where their contributions go, support can grow.

Rethinking the Begging Debate

Perhaps the debate should not be:

“Should begging be criminalised or allowed?”


Perhaps it should be:

How do we reduce street begging while protecting vulnerable people?


That is a better policy question. One can discourage exploitative or aggressive begging while also refusing to criminalise desperation. Those two things can coexist.

From Prohibition to Compassionate Policy

A powerful model could be:


Identify → Assess → Support → Reintegrate


Not merely:


Arrest → Prosecute → Repeat


Because punishment may remove people from the street for a day. Support can help remove the conditions that put them there.

A National Conversation Worth Having

Malawi has a strong tradition of community solidarity.

This proposal simply imagines extending that spirit into city-level social protection. Not just charity. Not just law enforcement. But structured compassion.


And perhaps that is the bigger opportunity hidden in this debate:

To move from managing poverty to reducing vulnerability.

To move from criminalising begging to organising compassion.

And to show that public order and human dignity do not have to be enemies.